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Abstract 
 
We observed the pattern of voting in the first round of 72 episodes of the UK version of the TV quiz-show „The 
Weakest Link‟ (WL). The first round culminated as each of the nine contestants carried out an eight-alternative-
forced-choice task by voting for one of their peers as the WL. Rudimentary probability theory was used to 
generate the frequencies of votes that would be expected purely due to chance for all eight relative positions of 
voter-to-candidate spatial relationships. The observed frequencies from the episodes were then compared to the 
expected pattern. Consensus, the number of contestants voting for the eventual WL, was also recorded in each of 
the 72 first rounds. Two main findings emerged:- i.) contestants avoided voting their direct neighbour as the WL, 
although the propensity to vote for a peer was not a simple function of distance per se; ii.) the „neighbour-
avoidance‟ effect increased as the group consensus as to the identity of the WL decreased. 
 
Introduction 
 
Observational field studies based on television quiz-shows are free from the kinds of demand characteristics and 
ethical concerns that can sometimes blight experimental work. Further, they are effectively double-blind, so 
providing a useful empirical test-bed for theories in social psychology, decision making and economics. For 
example, the popular TV quiz-show The Weakest Link (WL) has already been used to assess the optimal banking 
strategy in an analysis of economic decision making (Haan, Los and Riyanto, in press), as a test of gender and 
race discrimination in voting practice (Antonovics, Arcidiacono & Walsh, 2005) and to investigate the trade off 
between risk and return strategies in game playing (Barmish & Boston, 2009). We used a similar procedure to 
measure the voting behaviour of contestants as a function of the proximity of the voter to the candidate voted for. 
 
The spatial relationships between actors in social situations have a profound impact on their subsequent social 
behaviour. For instance, there is a clear link between the proximity of the „learner‟, „teacher‟ and authoritarian 
„experimenter‟ in Milgram‟s classic obedience paradigm and the level of obedience elicited in the „teacher‟. 
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Initially, obedience was at its greatest when the‟ teacher‟ was spatially remote from the „learner‟. Issuing 
instructions from a separate room seemed to make it easier for the „teacher‟ to administer punishment, but, in 
replications where the „learner‟ could be seen by the „teacher‟, obedience reduced until it almost disappeared 
when the „teacher‟ was instructed to physically place the „learner‟s‟ arm onto an electric plate in order to receive 
the punishment of an electric shock. Similarly, the „teacher‟s‟ level of obedience to authority diminished as the 
distance between the „teacher‟ and the authority figure of the „experimenter‟ increased (Milgram, 1974). 
 
We made two simple predictions about how spatial proximity could influence decision making. The 
configuration of contestants in the WL makes it easy to define the spatial relationship between all contestants, 
moreover each contestant is forced to make a discrete decision at the end of the first round of questions by voting 
for one of their peers. It follows that if the contestants are influenced by the spatial proximity of their fellows 
then we should expect voting frequency to vary as some function of spatial proximity. Firstly, we predicted an 
inverse relationship between frequency and proximity; contestants will be less likely to vote for their close 
neighbours so more likely to vote for those further away. Secondly, we expect that this relationship will become 
more pronounced as the consensus regarding the identity of the WL decreases. 
 
Method 
 
Rules of the Game 
 
Nine contestants were arranged in a semi circle (A-I) about a central host. Round one began when the first 
contestant alphabetically fielded the opening question. The first correct answer started a link in a prize-chain that 
began at zero and reached an upper ceiling of £1000 in nine turns. An incorrect answer broke the prize-chain and 
the money was lost although contestants had the option to terminate the prize-chain by saying “bank” at the 
beginning of their turn that ensured the accrued value of the prize-chain was transferred to a secure prize-fund 
with the prize-chain reset to zero. Questions were dealt sequentially in a clockwise direction such that when the 
contestant occupying position I fielded their question the sequence wrapped round to A again. This cycle of 
questions continued for two minutes unless terminated because a ceiling of £1000 had been accumulated in the 
prize-fund. The round culminated as each of the nine contestants made an eight-alternative-forced-choice blind 
vote for one fellow contestant that they considered to be the „weakest‟ contestant. The contestant that received 
the most votes was deemed the „weakest link‟ for that round and eliminated from the game. Ties were decided 
by the contestant that was the „strongest link‟. This procedure continued round by round until two contestants 
remained to contest a head-to-head decider. The eventual winner received the sum of the prize-fund accumulated 
over the previous rounds. 
 
Field observation 
 
The position and gender of each contestant was noted as was the contestant that they voted for as the WL at the 
end of round one. No other personal details of the contestants were recorded. Celebrity episodes were not 
included. Expected voting frequencies were derived by recourse to rudimentary probability theory. By assuming 
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a random unbiased model then the probability associated with a contestant voting for any of the other eight 
contestants was always 
1
/8 (0.125). As the contestants at the endpoints of the array, A and I,  were not considered 
as spatial neighbours ( even though they are strictly temporal neighbours in the sequence of questions) meant 
that they only had one direct neighbour each, whereas contestants B through H had two each. Therefore, the 
expected frequency for contestants voting for their neighbour in a single round was 2, simply the sum of the 
probabilities of individual contestants voting for their neighbour (2*0.125 + 7*0.25). Expected frequencies were 
calculated for all spatial relationships, neighbour, neighbour +1, ..........., neighbour + 7, giving, 2, 1.75, 1.5, 1.25, 
1, .75, .5, .25 respectively. Notice that these sum to nine, the same as the number of contestant votes in a single 
round. Over the course of 72 episodes the expected number of neighbour votes was 144.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results are presented in two parts reflecting our two main analyses, i.) voter-candidate proximity: the 
„neighbour-avoidance‟ effect, and ii.) the effect of consensus. 
 
i.) voter-candidate proximity: the ‘neighbour-avoidance’ effect 
 
 
 
Figure 1. compares the expected voting frequency (squares), derived as the unbiased pattern of voting, with the 
observed pattern of voting (diamonds). Voting frequency is plotted as a function of the spatial relationship 
between voter and candidate where ‘n’ refers to the voter’s neighbour and ‘n + 1’ the next-door-but-one 
neighbour and so on. (The data shown here excludes the votes cast by the eventual WL) 
 
If implicit processes operated to influence decision-making then they should become apparent as systematic 
biases over the course of many decisions. In the context of the WL, decisions were the votes cast  measured as a 
function of the spatial relationship between the voter and the candidate. Significant departures between the 
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unbiased pattern of voting and the observed pattern of voting can be seen above in Figure 1 where contestants 
were less likely to vote for their direct neighbour „n‟. Although this supports the predicted avoidance of voting 
for neighbours Figure 1 also shows that there was not a simple linear relationship between voting pattern and 
proximity as more distant candidates were not necessarily more likely to acquire votes. A comparison between 
voters‟ „neighbour votes‟ against „non-neighbour votes‟ was significant (2(1) = 7.508, p < .005). 
 
ii.) the effect of consensus 
 
Consensus refers to the number of votes accrued by the eventual WL. We make the assumption that in a  round 
where all eight contestants (aside from the WL themselves) vote for the same candidate then there is some  
degree of certainty over the identity of the weakest candidate. Likewise, low consensus rounds are indicative of 
uncertainty. Proximity biases are more likely to prevail in circumstances of uncertainty therefore we expect the 
neighbour-avoidance effect described above to increase with a decrease in consensus. Table 2 below shows the 
distribution of consensus across the 72 episodes. 
 
Consensus Frequency 
1 0 
2 1 
3 12 
4 16 
5 17 
6 11 
7 12 
8 3 
 
Table 1. shows the frequency distribution of episodes (n=72) by consensus, the number of votes cast for the 
eventual WL, during the first round of voting.  
 
The effect of consensus is shown in Figure 2. The leftmost points for „all (72)‟ replicate the data already 
presented in Figure 1. values associated with the proximity effect are shown moving rightwards by  
progressively stripping away higher consensus episodes. For example, the three episodes with the highest 
consensus, where all eight contestants vote for the WL, are taken away from the analysis for „-8 (69)‟. As more 
high consensus episodes, -7 & -6, are taken away notice that proximity effect increases as indicated by the 
increase in the value. This supports our second prediction that spatial proximity, and in particular the 
neighbour-avoidance effect,  increases with decreasing consensus. 
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Figure 2 plots the values for the proximity effect with the highest  consensus episodes gradually removed. The 
proximity effect is shown both for the episodes incorporating the votes made by the WL and excluding the WL. 
The red line represents the critical value for above which p < .05, two-tailed. 
 
There was no systematic bias in the spatial or temporal order of candidates as the observed frequencies (f0) of the 
WL found in each spatial position (A-I) compared to the expected frequency (fe) of 8 (n(episodes)/n(positions); 
72/9=8) was non-significant ((8) = 12.75, p = ns). Contestants were no more or less likely to vote for 
candidates that preceded or followed them temporally in the testing sequence. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our findings support our second prediction and our first prediction in part. The main finding is that contestants 
show a strong avoidance for voting for their direct neighbours, however, voting is not a simple function of the 
spatial distance between the voter and the candidate. As the consensus regarding the WL reduces then the 
neighbour-avoidance in the contestants‟ voting increases. 
 
We suggest that contestants made their voting decision based on the availability of two very different sources of 
information. Firstly, the game-specific and primary source of information was public, explicit and encompassed 
the observable performance of the contestants during the round of questions. When the integrity of this source of 
information was high and unambiguous, contestants faced an easy and reliable decision identifying the weakest 
performer. In these rounds there was high consensus over the identity of the WL. On the other hand, in rounds 
when game-specific information was equivocal, for example all candidates answered all questions correctly, then 
voters were in a quandary and had to rely instead on secondary subject-dependent sources of information. This 
subject-dependent source was private, implicit and encompassed each voter‟s individual subjective dependent 
attributions. In these rounds, group consensus over the identity of the WL was lower because decision making 
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shifted away from the primary high fidelity source of game-specific information to the secondary subject-
dependent source, more prone to biases like „neighbour-avoidance‟. We conclude that the format of TV quiz-
shows provides an ideal context to examine forced-choice decision making and the biases thereof. 
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